Week Twelve

NB. Please don't get too caught up in Freges own invented notation: hardly anyone uses it anymore. Concentrate on the ideas.

1. What is a definition? What do you think, what did Frege think?
2. Frege launches yet another attack on psychologism in the passage we read this week. Are you convinced?
3. What is the extension of a concept?
4. Do sentences really refer to truth values? If they don't, what do they refer to?
5. What does Frege say on pg 210 about extension and sets? Do you agree?
6. Much of the preface is a summary of what Frege has already covered. Does he sound pessimistic? Why? Should he have been? Do you think its a fair summary?

And from last time, if we have the time:

1. Should totality have to apply to natural languages or just the concept script. Someone (Kenny? Paul?) said the problem reoccurs in mathematics as there are some functions which 'don't work' in certain domains (e.g. Non Eculdian geometry). What do people think of this?

2. Is Blanchette's definition of completeness circular? Does it matter?

Week Eleven Cont

From last time:
3. Are thoughts public? Why/why not?


New Questions
1. What are sharp boundaries?
2. What does Frege think about sharp boundaries and concepts?
3. Do any concepts have sharp boundaries?
4. Does every concept have sharp boundaries? If this was true, would there ever be any 'Ceasar problems' (not just for number functions but for any terms)
5. What does Weiner think and who agrees with her?
6. What is linguistic completeness?
7. Is english lingustily complete?
8. What happens when mathematicians expand their domains? Discovery or invention, and why does it matter?

Week Eleven

1. What do you think a 'thought' is? What did Frege think? Did it change?

2. If me and you are thinking/grasping the same thing, what does that involve?

3. Are thoughts public? Why/why not?

4. Can we fully translate sentences from a different language? Does anything get 'lost in translation'?

5. Can different sentences express the same thought?

6. Do 1+1=2 and 1+2=3 express the same thought?

7. What is recarving?

8. What does it take to grasp a thought?

Week Ten

The Dummet is up on Canvas by the way.

1. Why is it that " in one sense we have progressed very little since Frege"? Do you agree?

2. Look at the account Dummet gives of Frege (esp. around pg 89). Do you agree with Dummet?

3. What are the differences between Tascheck's Frege and Dummet's Frege?

4. 'Meaning' and 'theory of meaning' are tricky phrases. Does dummet use them differently to Frege? Look esp. at pg 84 ish and pg 91 onwards.

5. What is the realtionship between the following...
sense of
truth value of
reference of
information convayed by
 a sentence.

6. What are senses? Contrast Dummets view with Russells and Pauls. Which is the most succesful? Why? Which did Frege intend?

7. How rich an answer to qu 6 do we need to give? (eg will 'mode of presentation' be enough?).

Week Nine Cont

1. What is what Tashcek calls the 'logical basis for sense'?
2. Look back at Sense and Reference: do you agree that Tascheck's is the right interpretation? (Especially think about the phrase 'cognitive significance' and if thats a problem for Tasheck)
3.What is the Russellian view, and what is the neo-Russellian view? What motivated the departure?
4. What is the cluster view of descriptions? Does it resemble what Devin and Kenny were advocating yesterday? Does it work?
5. How might the neo-Russellian (or Millian) respond to Frege's puzzle about identity? Does it work?
6. Recall the puzzle of ambiguity we discussed last time. (Google this if you don't remember). Is it more of a problem for the Millian or the Fregan or is it equal?

Week Nine

1. What is the distinction between sense and reference?
2. What is the Millian view of what constitutes the meaning of a name? (We talked about this last time; if you don't remember google it). How does this fall foul of the puzzle Frege poses at the start of the paper? Is there any way of saving Millianism from this puzzle?
3. Empty names are names like 'Santa' 'Sherlock Holmes'. Do they have meaning? In virtue of what?
4. What does Frege mean by differing 'cognitive significance'?
5. Frege thinks senses are public. Do you agree?
6. Are senses descriptions? Why/why not?
7. What might the identity criteria for senses be?
8. What do you think of Frege's proposal that assertoric sentences name The True or The False?

Week Eight

1. Why does Frege say 'the concept horse is not a concept'?
2. How problematic is it to endorse the above?
3. How much does the linguistic turn influence the moves here?
4. What is what Parons calls Frege's strict theory about the functioning of ordinary language?
5. Is this strict theory flawed, and why?
6. What is Parsons solution to the concept horse problem? What do you think of it?
7. Is the concept horse a concept?