Week Six

Before/during or after reading the paper, find out what the 'problem of the unity of the proposition' (sometimes called 'Bradley's regress') is. We'll be talking about it in class.

Thinking questions:
1. Why does Frege say "what is logically simple cannot have a definition". Do you agree?
2. What influence does the Linguistic Turn have on the arguments you find in 'On Concept and Object'
3. Is the concept horse a concept? Why?
4. Frege says he was not trying to give a definition of a concept, only 'hints'. He is confronted, he says, by 'an awkwardness of language'. What do you think of this?
5. Why is the behavior of a concept 'essentially predicative', and why does it matter?
6. Frege holds that concepts are unsaturated, and objects are saturated. What does this mean?
7. How might the saturated/unsaturated distinction help solve the problem of the unity of the proposition?

Week Five Cont

1. What 2 step process does Blanchette claim Frege thinks we can use to demonstrate the ultimate grounds for a body of truths? Have you seen this two step process at work during the topics covered in this course?

2. What does Frege 'reduce' the concept of ordering into?

3.What is it to 'reduce' a concept?

4. What is a stipulative definition, and how does Blanchette claim Frege uses them?

5. How does Frege use 'definition' in the Foundations when he is discussing the possibility of a definition of number?

6. Do you think Frege uses 'definition' in different ways?

7. How much of a distance is there between B and B* on pg 24? Why does it matter?

Week Five

1. What are the 4 formulations of the JC prob which Greimann details?
2. Does Hume's principle alone solve (any versions of) the JC prob?
3. Why does Heck think that the logical formulation of the JC prob is not a problem for Frege (or at least, for Frege as found in Foundations)? How much does it matter if the JC prob only applies to latter Frege?
4. What is the generalised context principle for reference? How does it affect the semantic formulation of the JC prob?
5. How are the different JC probs related to each other? Are any more prior than the others?

Week Four Cont

1. What is the lingustic turn?
2. How much of the philosophy you have encountered so far (not just in my course but in others too) seems to be influenced by the lingustic turn?
3. Why does Frege want to devlop a logically perfect language?
4.In what ways is Frege's language more expressive than natural language, and in what ways is it less?
5. How should we analyze statements containing the identity symbol?
6. Are complete expressions which designate objects the only things which can meaningfully appear either side of an identity symbol?

NB Weiner uses 'Sense and Meaning' to talk about the paper which is also commonly called 'Sense and Reference'

Week Four Questions

1. What is the context principle?

2. What is the principle of individuation?

3. What is the principle of compositionality?

4. Does compositionality threaten the context principle?

5. On pg 17 Linnebo says "Does this show that my account is committed to an extravagant and implausible ontology"? What is he talking about, and does it commit him to an implausible ontology?

6. Do we think of natural numbers as cardinals or ordinals? Why does it matter?

Week Three Cont

Think about this question from last time, which we didn't get a chance to address much:

3. Why must we not ask for the meaning of a word in isolation?

Also think about the following:

1. Frege offers what looks to be a promising and natural definition of number in passage 55 (pg 105 of the Beany). What is this definition and why does Frege reject it?

2. What is the Julius Caesar problem?

3. Frege offers an argument in passage 57 (pg 106 in Beany) that numbers must be objects. What is the argument, and what do you think of it?

4. What does Frege mean by an 'independent object'?

5. Frege says 'not every objective object has a location'. Do you agree?

6. What is Hume's principle?

7.Can we define numbers in terms of the extension of concepts? How?

8. Are numbers objects? Why/why not?

Week Three Questions

1. What insight do normal mathematicians have to the nature of numbers? (What do you think, what does Frege think)

2. Why does Frege think that images and thoughts in our mind are not what mathematics is about?

3. Why must we not ask for the meaning of a word in isolation?

4. The study of arithmetic involves studying an infinite number of truths. Can we then aximotize it?

5. Mill holds that the definition of each number involves the assertion of a physical fact. Do you agree? Did Frege? Why/why not?

6. Does the number 0 have different ontological status than the number 1? Is 0 a number at all?

Week Two Cont

Hi All,

For tomorrow, think back about the questions we talked about last time. Have you changed your opinion about any of them in light of the discussion, or reading the Goldfarb paper?

(Especially think about:

1. What was Frege's goal when writing the concept script?

5. Is logic a branch of psychology? What do you think? What did Frege think?

7. Why might we want to axiomatize logic?

8. What is logic?)

Also have a think about the following questions:

1. What is the difference between what Goldfarb calls the modern conception of logic (schematic), and Freges conception of logic (universalist)?

2. Should logic have a truth predicate? Why/why not?

3. What is it to show that an inference is justified?