Week Fifteen Cont

1.
A. Is that door open?
B. The door is open

Do A and B express the same thoughts? Do they have the same senses?

2. Are there such things as false thoughts? Why/why not?

3. If there are such things as false thoughts, what makes them false? (Hard question)

4. Does
A. (not (not (p) ) )   express the same thought as
B. p

Week Fifteen

1. What is it for a thought to be 'true'?
2. Do we need a truth predicate?
3. What is the relationship between assertoric sentences and thoughts?
4. What is a thought?
5. Do you agree with Frege's answers to the above questions?

Week Thirteen

1. What is conceptual analysis?

2. Think of some other conceptual analysis you have done in other philosophy courses? What was the purpose? What was the method?

3. If we 'recarve' a sentence/thought, is it the same thought? Why might you think not?

4. Whats the cognitive criterion for thoughts?

5. How should we individuate thoughts?

6. What was Frege trying to preserve in his conceptual analysis? What do you think, what did Dummet think, and what does Blanchette think?

Week Twelve Cont

1. What is an extension of a concept?
2. What is Basic Law V, and why does Frege need it?
3. What is Russell's paradox?
4. How should we respond to Russell's paradox?

Week Twelve

NB. Please don't get too caught up in Freges own invented notation: hardly anyone uses it anymore. Concentrate on the ideas.

1. What is a definition? What do you think, what did Frege think?
2. Frege launches yet another attack on psychologism in the passage we read this week. Are you convinced?
3. What is the extension of a concept?
4. Do sentences really refer to truth values? If they don't, what do they refer to?
5. What does Frege say on pg 210 about extension and sets? Do you agree?
6. Much of the preface is a summary of what Frege has already covered. Does he sound pessimistic? Why? Should he have been? Do you think its a fair summary?

And from last time, if we have the time:

1. Should totality have to apply to natural languages or just the concept script. Someone (Kenny? Paul?) said the problem reoccurs in mathematics as there are some functions which 'don't work' in certain domains (e.g. Non Eculdian geometry). What do people think of this?

2. Is Blanchette's definition of completeness circular? Does it matter?

Week Eleven Cont

From last time:
3. Are thoughts public? Why/why not?


New Questions
1. What are sharp boundaries?
2. What does Frege think about sharp boundaries and concepts?
3. Do any concepts have sharp boundaries?
4. Does every concept have sharp boundaries? If this was true, would there ever be any 'Ceasar problems' (not just for number functions but for any terms)
5. What does Weiner think and who agrees with her?
6. What is linguistic completeness?
7. Is english lingustily complete?
8. What happens when mathematicians expand their domains? Discovery or invention, and why does it matter?

Week Eleven

1. What do you think a 'thought' is? What did Frege think? Did it change?

2. If me and you are thinking/grasping the same thing, what does that involve?

3. Are thoughts public? Why/why not?

4. Can we fully translate sentences from a different language? Does anything get 'lost in translation'?

5. Can different sentences express the same thought?

6. Do 1+1=2 and 1+2=3 express the same thought?

7. What is recarving?

8. What does it take to grasp a thought?