Friday 24 October 2014

Week Ten

The Dummet is up on Canvas by the way.

1. Why is it that " in one sense we have progressed very little since Frege"? Do you agree?

2. Look at the account Dummet gives of Frege (esp. around pg 89). Do you agree with Dummet?

3. What are the differences between Tascheck's Frege and Dummet's Frege?

4. 'Meaning' and 'theory of meaning' are tricky phrases. Does dummet use them differently to Frege? Look esp. at pg 84 ish and pg 91 onwards.

5. What is the realtionship between the following...
sense of
truth value of
reference of
information convayed by
 a sentence.

6. What are senses? Contrast Dummets view with Russells and Pauls. Which is the most succesful? Why? Which did Frege intend?

7. How rich an answer to qu 6 do we need to give? (eg will 'mode of presentation' be enough?).

Wednesday 22 October 2014

Week Nine Cont

1. What is what Tashcek calls the 'logical basis for sense'?
2. Look back at Sense and Reference: do you agree that Tascheck's is the right interpretation? (Especially think about the phrase 'cognitive significance' and if thats a problem for Tasheck)
3.What is the Russellian view, and what is the neo-Russellian view? What motivated the departure?
4. What is the cluster view of descriptions? Does it resemble what Devin and Kenny were advocating yesterday? Does it work?
5. How might the neo-Russellian (or Millian) respond to Frege's puzzle about identity? Does it work?
6. Recall the puzzle of ambiguity we discussed last time. (Google this if you don't remember). Is it more of a problem for the Millian or the Fregan or is it equal?

Monday 20 October 2014

Week Nine

1. What is the distinction between sense and reference?
2. What is the Millian view of what constitutes the meaning of a name? (We talked about this last time; if you don't remember google it). How does this fall foul of the puzzle Frege poses at the start of the paper? Is there any way of saving Millianism from this puzzle?
3. Empty names are names like 'Santa' 'Sherlock Holmes'. Do they have meaning? In virtue of what?
4. What does Frege mean by differing 'cognitive significance'?
5. Frege thinks senses are public. Do you agree?
6. Are senses descriptions? Why/why not?
7. What might the identity criteria for senses be?
8. What do you think of Frege's proposal that assertoric sentences name The True or The False?

Wednesday 15 October 2014

Week Eight

1. Why does Frege say 'the concept horse is not a concept'?
2. How problematic is it to endorse the above?
3. How much does the linguistic turn influence the moves here?
4. What is what Parons calls Frege's strict theory about the functioning of ordinary language?
5. Is this strict theory flawed, and why?
6. What is Parsons solution to the concept horse problem? What do you think of it?
7. Is the concept horse a concept?